The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation

One of the central concerns about American policy making institutions is the degree to which political outcomes can be influenced by interested parties. While the literature on interest group strategies in particular institutions - legislative, administrative, and legal - is extensive, there is very little scholarship which examines how the interdependencies between institutions affects the strategies of groups. In this paper we examine in a formal theoretical model how the opportunity to litigate administrative rulemaking in the courts affects the lobbying strategies of competing interest groups at the rulemaking stage. Using a resource-based view of group activity, we develop a number of important insights about each stage that cannot be observed by examining each one in isolation. We demonstrate that lobbying effort responds to the ideology of the court, and the responsiveness of the court to resources. In particular, (1) as courts become more biased toward the status quo, interest group lobbying investments become smaller, and may be eliminated all together, (2) as interest groups become wealthier, they spend more on lobbying, and (3) as the responsiveness of courts to resources decreases, the effect it has on lobbying investments depends on the underlying ideology of the court

The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation

One of the central concerns about American policy-making institutions is the degree to which political outcomes can be influenced by interested parties. While the literature on interest group strategies in particular institutions - legislative, administrative, and legal is extensive, there is very little scholarship which examines how the interdependencies between institutions affects the strategies of groups. In this paper we examine in a formal theoretical model, how the opportunity to litigate administrative rulemaking in the courts affects the lobbying strategies of competing interest groups at the rulemaking stage. Using a resource-based view of group activity, we develop a number of important insights about each stage - which cannot be observed by examining each one in isolation. We demonstrate that lobbying effort responds to the ideology of the court, and the responsiveness of the court to resources. In particular, 1) as courts become more biased toward the status quo, interest group lobbying investments become smaller, and may be eliminated all together, 2) as interest groups become wealthier, they spend more on lobbying, and 3) as the responsiveness of courts to resources decreases, the effect it has on lobbying investments depends on the underlying ideology of the court.

When Do Interest Groups Use Electronic Rulemaking?

This paper analyzes how electronic rulemaking is affecting the propensity of interest groups to file comments and replies at the Federal Communications Commission. The paper shows that exogenous events and a handful of issues drive filing behavior. Implications of the analysis are discussed

Lobbying and Information in Politics

The vast majority of papers written about interest groups ’ political in uence focuses on the role of money in politics. Business and interest groups ’ partici-pation in campaign nance, in the form of hard and soft money, has been the subject of hundreds of theoretical and empirical studies. Moreover, with the recent congressional moves to reform campaign nance laws, campaign nance studies have received a prominent position in public discourse. There are two striking results about this line of academic work. First, political action committees (PACs) gave $245 million to congressional candidates in form of campaign contributions in the 1999–2000 election cycle (about$123 million annually), and corporations, unions, and interest groups gave $153 million in “soft money ” to political parties during the 1997–1998 election cycle (about$76 million annually).1 Yet, Congress controls a $2 trillion budget, nearly 40 percent of which is discretionary spending. This raises a potential puzzle: why do interest groups pay so little ($200 million annually) to try to in uence policy? To answer this question, we turn to a second striking result from the academi

Committee Jurisdiction, Congressional Behavior and Policy Outcomes

The literature on congressional committees has largely overlooked the impact of jurisdictional fights on policy proposals and outcomes. This paper develops a theory of how legislators balance the benefits of expanded committee jurisdiction against preferred policy outcomes. It shows why a) senior members and young members in safe districts are most likely to challenge a committee’s jurisdiction; b) policy proposals may be initiated off the proposer’s ideal point in order to obtain jurisdiction; c) policy outcomes will generally be more moderate with jurisdictional fights than without these turf wars. We empirically investigate these results examining proposed Internet intellectual property protection legislation in the 106th Congress

Fairness and Redistribution- the Case of Latin American Countries

Following the suggestion of modern egalitarians, the model proposed by Alesina & Angeletos (2005) sets up a fairness rule based on composition of equality, designated by the weights of effort and luck. However, empirical evidence for a set of Latin American countries suggests that, unlike developed countries, these societies do not have a well-established view about the role of merit on economic outcome. Therefore, this paper proposes a theoretical framework based on a new fairness rule, namely the perception that the country does not offer everyone with the same opportunities. The new parameterization leads to a unique and stable equilibrium, characterized by an intermediate level of taxation between the equilibria of the "U.S." and of "Europe".Redistribution,Fairness,Fairness

A DevOps approach to integration of software components in an EU research project

We present a description of the development and deployment infrastructure being created to support the integration effort of HARNESS, an EU FP7 project. HARNESS is a multi-partner research project intended to bring the power of heterogeneous resources to the cloud. It consists of a number of different services and technologies that interact with the OpenStack cloud computing platform at various levels. Many of these components are being developed independently by different teams at different locations across Europe, and keeping the work fully integrated is a challenge. We use a combination of Vagrant based virtual machines, Docker containers, and Ansible playbooks to provide a consistent and up-to-date environment to each developer. The same playbooks used to configure local virtual machines are also used to manage a static testbed with heterogeneous compute and storage devices, and to automate ephemeral larger-scale deployments to Grid5000. Access to internal projects is managed by GitLab, and automated testing of services within Docker-based environments and integrated deployments within virtual-machines is provided by Buildbot

The Timing, Intensity, and Composition of Interest Group Lobbying: An Analysis of Structural Policy Windows in the States

This is the first paper to statistically examine the timing of interest group lobbying. It introduces a theoretical framework based on recurring structural policy windows' and argues that these types of windows should have a large effect on the intensity and timing of interest group activity. Using a new database of all lobbying expenditures in the U.S. states ranging up to 25 years, the paper shows interest group lobbying increases substantially during one of these structural windows in particular--the budgeting process. Spikes in lobbying during budgeting are driven primarily by business groups. Moreover, even groups relatively unaffected by budgets lobby more intensely during legislative budgeting, consistent with the theory that these interests are attempting to have legislators attach (de)regulatory riders to the budget bills. Overall, the paper demonstrates that these structural policy windows largely determine lobbying expenditures.